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Recent Cases

I
pay the invoices that Sign subsequently
mailed to her.
Sign filed a collection suit against
DeLaurenti, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment on
DeLaurenti's part. DeLaurenti counterclaimed and alleged that Sign violated the CPA. The Washington trial
court held that Sign violated the CPA
and awarded DeLaurenti treble damages and attorney's fees. Sign appealed
the decision to the Washington Court
of Appeals.
Sign's Arguments Unplugged by
Appellate Court
The appellate court first addressed
Sign's argument that the trial court
erroneously submitted the CPA claim
to the jury because insufficient evidence existed to support it. The court
noted that a CPA violation occurs when
(1) the action complained of is a deceptive act or practice; (2) the action occurs in the conduct of trade or commerce; (3) sufficient evidence of public interest is presented; (4) injury to a
business transpires; and (5) a causal
link exists between the deceptive act
and the injury.
The court found that DeLaurenti
demonstrated all the elements of a CPA
violation and upheld her claim under
the CPA. First, the court stated that
Kelly's misleading DeLaurenti into
believing that she was signing a work
authorization form constituted an unfair act or practice in trade. Second,
the court found that Kelly's capacity as
Sign's agent presented sufficient evidence of an impact on the public interest. The court also found that
DeLaurenti suffered injury to her business, therefore meeting the fourth element of a CPA violation, because
Delaurenti had to spend time addressing the contract dispute rather that
attending the store. Lastly, the court
concluded that the deceptive act directly caused the injury to DeLaurenti's
business. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's finding that
Sign violated the CPA.
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Treble Damages Too Much
The court, however, agreed with
Sign's contention that treble damages
were improper since DeLaurenti could
not prove any actual damages. In its
determination, the court concluded that
attorney's fees were not actual damages as contemplated by the CPA.
Furthermore, the court concluded that
DeLaurenti's general and uncorroborated estimate of her lost profits
also failed to constitute actual damages. Therefore the court held that
since DeLaurenti could not prove any
actual damages, her claim for treble
damages was unsubstantiated.
Attorney' Fees were Reasonable
Awards
Although Sign did not dispute that
the CPA entitled DeLaurenti to
attorney's fees, it did argue that the
trial court improperly calculated the
award of attorney's fees. The court,
however, reasoned that the trial court
had discretion in awarding attorney's
fees, and thus, upheld the trial court's
determination. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that in its determination, the trial court segregated the
fees to the extent possible between the
CPA theories and other legal theories
presented by DeLaurenti. The appellate court deemed such action appropriate, and therefore concluded that the
lower court acted within its discretion.
Dissent Argued that Shop was Not
Significantly Injured
In his dissent, Judge Scholfield stated
that the evidence of injury to the floral
shop was insufficient to support the
award of attorney's fees. To support
this claim, Scholfield stated that neither attorney's fees in prosecuting a
CPA violation nor the time devoted to
the CPA litigation were sufficient proof
of injury. Thus, Scholfield concluded
that DeLaurenti failed to present sufficient evidence that she suffered a legally recognizable injury. *
- Ellen M. Sfikas

Toll-Free Phone Line Failed
to ProvideAdequate
Warning Under California
Statute
In Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), the California Court of Appeals held that a tollfree phone line warning system failed
to clearly and reasonably warn consumers about dangerous chemicals contained in consumer products and therefore violated California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986.
Failureto Warn
California's Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986
("Act") forbade any person or entity
from intentionally or knowingly exposing anyone to a chemical associated
with cancer or birth defects without
first giving "clear and reasonable" warning. The Act acknowledged that generalized warnings such as product labels, posted notices, and notices in
news media adequately warned consumers, assuming that they were "clear
and reasonable." The California State
Health and Welfare Agency ("Agency")
administered the Act and promulgated
regulations defining appropriate conduct under the Act.
The Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. ("Council") is a nonprofit corporation consisting of thirtyseven manufacturers, retailers, and agricultural producers involved in marketing thousands of products in California stores. Founded in 1987, the
Council sought to help its members
comply with the Act. The Council
established a consumer warning system
based on a toll-free phone line in conjunction with newspaper advertising
and signs posted in stores. Although
the Council's advertisements and signs
failed to identify those products which
required warnings under the Act, they
invited consumers to call a toll-free
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number and inquire about specific products.
The Council brought an action
against California's attorney general,
seeking both an authoritative interpretation of regulations promulgated under the Act and a declaration that its
system clearly and reasonably warned
consumers. The attorney general responded by seeking a declaration that
the system failed to provide clear and
reasonable warning. The trial court
held that the system violated the regulations and therefore violated the Act.
The Council appealed, contending that
the trial court: 1) misinterpreted the
regulations' "safe harbor" warning provisions; 2) applied the wrong standard
in evaluating the system; and 3) based
its decision upon insufficient evidence.
Toll-Free Phone Schemes Are Not
ClearandReasonable Per Se
Since violations of the Act result in
civil liability, the Agency promulgated
regulations containing "safe harbor"
warning methods. The Agency deemed
the safe harbor methods per se clear and
reasonable, thus removing the need for
factual determinations of clearness and
reasonableness. The Agency also established the following warning methods for consumer products as clear and
reasonable per se: product labels with
specified text; shelf signs with specified text; and a scheme of signs, public
advertising, and toll-free phone services that provide clear and reasonable
warning. Thus, of the three warning
schemes listed, only the toll-free phone
line independently required clear and
reasonable warning.
Although the Council conceded that
toll-free phone lines could not qualify
as "pure" safe harbor methods, it argued that the extra condition of clear
and reasonable warning only required
it to provide a quality phone line as
compared to other toll-free phone lines.
The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument. The court relied
on the Agency's Final Statement of
Reasons, which denied toll-free phone
lines safe harbor status because the
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Agency did not consider them clear and
reasonable per se.
The Council also argued that no
bright line existed between safe harbor
and non-safe harbor warnings. They
maintained that even product labels
and shelf signs must be reasonably
presented to qualify as safe harbor
methods. The court, however, rejected
this argument because the Council overstated the regulations' threshold requirement that product labels and shelf
signs be easily noticeable. Moreover,
the court found no language in the
regulation creating an intermediate standard between safe harbor and non-safe
harbor warnings. Thus, whether the
system compared favorably to other
toll-free phone lines was irrelevant to
whether it clearly and reasonably
warned consumers.
The Trial CourtApplied the Correct
Standardof Review
The regulations provided that whenever the Act required a clear and reasonable warning the method of transmitting that warning, must be reasonably calculated, considering alternative methods, to make the warning
available to consumers before exposure. The trial court held that reasonable calculation implied effectiveness
in operation. The Council, however,
contended that even if the trial court
correctly viewed the system as a nonsafe harbor method, it erred by requiring that the system operate effectively.
The Council argued that reasonable
calculation contemplated only the situation when it created the system, not
whether the system effectively warned
consumers at an unspecified later date.
The appellate court considered this
interpretation too narrow. The court
held that an initial calculation of a
warning's effectiveness may prove
unreasonable in light of experience.
The court stated that adhering to an
incorrect initial judgment about a warning method's efficacy violated the Act's
requirement of clear and reasonable
warning.
The Council also argued that the

trial court's requirement that the system effectively convey warnings conflicted with the regulations' language
stating such warnings merely be made
available before exposure. The appellate court rejected this argument too,
because it viewed effective conveyance
and availability as consistent, when
considered in context. The court construed availability as the probability of
consumers perceiving a warning message. Similarly, effective conveyance
described the likelihood of consumers
seeing or hearing a warning before
exposure, not whether they understood
that warning and acted upon it.
Consequently, the system's invitation to inquire about specific products
through the toll-free phone line failed
to make the required warnings available within the regulations' meaning
because consumers could receive the
warning only through considerable effort. The court also held that although
the Council need not use the most
effective warning method possible, it
could not reject measures which would
significantly improve the warnings'
effectiveness without significantly increasing costs.
Ample Evidence Supported the Trial
Court'sDecision
The Council also argued that the
trial court erred because it based its
decision upon insufficient evidence.
The appellate court acknowledged the
Council's evidence suggesting public
apathy about the Act. The court also
recognized that adopting safe harbor
warning methods would increase costs
and that product labels and shelf signs
sometimes fail. The court held, however, that evidence of the system's
failure to clearly and reasonably warn
consumers amply supported the trial
court's decision.
The record showed that the system
provided only 488 warning messages
in its first year, even though over 26,000
calls reached the system. The court of
appeals held that this evidence alone
created an inference that the system
failed to clearly and reasonably warn
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consumers. The attorney general's
expert witnesses, moreover, testified
that consumers probably would not
spend time to identify specific products
and then phone to receive warnings.
The experts explained that impulse
motivates two-thirds of grocery buying decisions and that consumers typically decline to research inexpensive
purchases.
Expert testimony also established
that the Council's store signs were
inconspicuous, that the newspaper advertisements were infrequent, and that
the phone line's taped messages would
likely discourage all but the most diligent consumers. The court recognized
that the small number of warnings the
Council provided in its first year resulted from consumers' assumption of
product safety, rather than from their
apathy. One expert testified that the
least effective product label would convey warnings required under the Act
more effectively than the Council's
toll-free phone system. *
-

Matthew Brady

Only Plaintiffs Can
Constitutionally Receive
Punitive Damages
In Smith v. States General Life Ins.
Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992), the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a
trial court lacks the authority to allo-

cate a portion of a constitutionally
valid punitive damage to any entity
other than a plaintiff.
FraudulentInsurance
Martin B. Smith ("Smith") purchased a medical insurance policy from
Fred White ("White"). At the time of
the purchase, White represented to Smith
that the insurance company would reconsider certain conditions excluded
from the policy one year later. White
stated that if, upon the reconsideration
of the policy a year later, Smith's
physical condition remained stable or
improved, the insurance company would
delete the exclusions.
The actual policy, which was issued
by States General Life Insurance Company ("States"), included States' standard "Reconsideration Privilege." This
provision also indicated that States
would consider deleting any exclusions
one year after the issuance of the policy.
Smith sued States, White, and
White's employer, The Barton Agency
("Defendants"), claiming fraud in and
about the sale of a policy for medical
insurance coverage. Smith alleged that
the Defendants never intended to reconsider the policy exclusions. In addition, Smith stated that the Defendants intended to deceive him in an
effort to induce him to buy the policy.
Smith filed his claim and presented
his case to a jury. The jury awarded
Smith punitive damages of $250,000
and compensatory damages of $600.
The Defendants filed several post-trial
motions asserting that the punitive damage award was excessive.

Mini-Van Recall
Ford Motor Co. and Nissan Motor Co. have recalled some 1993-model
mini-vans because the vehicles may have suffered accidental fuel hose cuts
during assembly. The 1,700 vehicles recalled are the Mercury Villager and
the Nissan Quest, which are the products of a joint venture between Ford
and Nissan and which are built side-by-side at a plant in Avon Lake, Ohio.
The fuel-hose problem may cause fuel leaks in those vehicles.
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Sorry Insurance Company
Based on its conclusion that the
punitive damage award was within the
jury's authority, the trial court denied
the Defendants' motions. The trial
court based its evaluation of the punitive damages on statutory law and two
Alabama cases, Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986)
and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.
2d 218 (Ala. 1989). In accordance
with the applicable statute, Ala. Code
§ 6-11-23, and these cases, the court
found that the punitive damage award
was proper and an appropriate tool
with which to punish the Defendants.
Specifically, the trial court noted
that the award represented a windfall to
Smith and would injure, but not seriously affect, States. The court also
determined that the punitive award was
not related to the compensatory award.
In addition, the court considered the
high degree of reprehensibility and the
pattern of conduct employed by States.
Although the court found that States
had ample opportunity to remedy the
situation, it noted that States had neither acknowledged nor made any attempt to remedy the wrong.
The trial court proceeded to allocate
one-half of the punitive damages
awarded to Smith to the American
Heart Association. In so doing, the
court relied on the concurring opinion
in Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins.
Co., 577 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1991) in
which Justice Shores stated that trial
courts have the inherent power to allocate punitive damages. Within this
power, the court could allocate an award
in a way that would serve the purposes
behind punitive damages to a greater
degree than to grant the whole award to
the plaintiff. An appeal was filed and
taken to the Alabama Supreme Court.
Punitive DamageAward Was Proper
The Supreme Court of Alabama
upheld the $250,000 punitive damage
award. The court noted that based on
the trial court's findings, there was no
evidence indicating that the jury's verdict was founded on improper motives
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